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BISMARCK.*

IT has been said—and Bismarck himself has been credited with the saying—that men who make history seldom write it; however, even before the personal memoirs of the great hermit have become accessible to us, it may be safely said, that,—like the shrewd old Roman general and emperor, Julius Cæsar,—the German Chancellor was great in the world of letters as well as in that of action, and more than probably, in the future, his *works* will be read by many a man and child who knows little or nothing of his gigantic *work*. Even at present, there are some who make it their chief object to study Bismarck, the author, and selections from his writings are being prepared as text books for school and college purposes; and the more objectively he will be read, the more will the purely literary value of his works be recognized.

The official documents, issued by him are, indeed, models of a terse, forceful style, such as we might expect to find in English rather than in the usually more suggestive, subtle, complex German manner of expression.

His parliamentary speeches also show a plain directness, always supported by an austere sense of duty, a feeling of grave responsibilities, hurling at the opponent the whole weight of his crushing contempt, or else covering him with aspersions of bitter irony, and often lifting the subject above the sphere of ordinary political opportunism by an epigrammatic utterance of a general maxim, or by a magnificent appeal to the best impulses of his German people; thus, when against the uncompromising, centrifugal tendencies of the various party leaders, he insists that the necessary basis of all constitutional life is the compromise; when with all his old Prussian antipathy against a free pass, he frankly confesses that the strongest safe-guard against corruption is the element of publicity in the administra-

*An address delivered at Bloomington, Indiana, soon after Bismarck's death, (July 31, 1898.)

tion of State affairs; when in answer to his opponents' petty fear or threat of popular displeasure, he says, in substance, that you can safely count on winning a German over to the highest sacrifice by a just appeal to his sense of duty; or when in the midst of a critical situation he exclaims, "We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world," and "it is love of God which prompts us to pursue a policy of peace and reconciliation."

Such and many other expressions found their way in every peasant's house, they touch every German's heart and they, more even than his real work as the Iron Chancellor, have made Bismarck a truly popular hero.

Almost everywhere we find in his speeches the passionate expression of the whole man; if the subject seemed at all worth his interest; else we see him in calm repose and indifference. Once, during a stormy session of the Prussian parliament, when he had just succeeded in frustrating Austria's attempt to interfere with a treaty on the Zollverein, between Prussia and France,—in the midst of the heated discussion raging in the house,—Bismarck quietly sat at his ministerial desk and wrote, in English, a little private letter to his old friend, the American historian John Lathrop Motley,—he used to call him "Jack, my dear." This letter, as indeed the whole correspondence, is very interesting.

"I hate politics," he writes, "but as you say truly, like the grocer hating figs. I am none the less obliged to keep my thoughts increasingly occupied with those figs. Even at this moment, while I am writing to you, my ears are full of it. I am obliged to listen to particularly tasteless speeches out of the mouths of uncommonly childish and excited politicians, and I have therefore a moment of unwilling leisure, which I cannot use better than in giving you news of my welfare. I never thought that in my riper years I should be obliged to carry on such an unworthy trade as that of a Parliamentary Minister. As Envoy, although only an official, I still had the feeling of being a Gentleman; as Parliamentary Minister one is a helot. I have come down in the world and hardly know how—I am

sitting again in the House of Phrases where people talk nonsense, and end my letter. All these people have agreed to approve our treaties with Belgium, in spite of which twenty speakers scold each other with the greatest vehemence, as if each wished to make an end of the other; they are not agreed about the motives which make them unanimous; hence, alas! a regular German squabble about the Emperor's beard—querelle d'Allemand!"

And this may lead us to just a few more remarks about his *private* letters. Here he throws off the official garb entirely. This is but natural; but what characterizes Bismarck is the perfect ease with which he keeps his private circle intact and quite apart from his public life, with which he saves his own private self for himself, his family and his friends.

When public affairs are referred to, it is done in a tone of good-natured humor as in the letter to "Jack, my dear," to Motley, an admixture of self-irony is frequent. It all is in a nature of a good after dinner talk or rather an after battle talk, and that even in the midst of most trying situations, of struggles, which would have completely absorbed the energies of a dozen other men. Nor did he tolerate any meddling with his private life. When the present Emperor, William II, undertook to dictate to him what persons he was at liberty to receive in his house, he replied: "Your Majesty's authority ends at the door of my wife's drawing room." In most of his private letters a sort of rough and ready humor prevails, and at times, indeed, his phraseology is a bit startling. A few specimens may perhaps be given: first, one of the milder type. In one of his earlier letters to his sister who had just gotten married, he writes:

"After you had left I naturally found the house very dull. I sat me down by the fireside, and smoking, pondered how very unnatural and selfish it is that girls who have brothers, and above all, unmarried brothers, should recklessly plunge into matrimony and behave as if they were only in the world for the purpose of fulfilling their own wonderful inclinations, a selfishness from which our sex, and myself in particular, I know to be hap-

pily free. After I had confessed to myself the uselessness of these reflections I rose from the green leather chair and plunged at once head long into the election contest, from which I emerged with the certainty that four voters were inclined to go in for me for life or death and two more with a certain amount of lukewarmness. Then there are four voters for Krug, 16 to 18 for Arnim, and from 12 to 15 for Alvensleben. I thought, therefore, on the whole that I had better retire."

And later he writes, again to his sister :

"I must marry, the devil take me. I feel lonely and forsaken, and this mild damp weather makes me melancholy and longingly prone to love. It is no use of my struggling. I shall have to marry; * * * * She makes no impression upon me, it is true; but that is the case with all of them; still, unfortunate are those, who cannot change their inclinations with their linen, however seldom the latter event may occur."

This letter is characteristic for Bismarck in more than one way. We observe the superb unbroken strength of the man who holds as in a lover's embrace the mighty waters of the North Sea, this most terrific, most vicious body of water on the face of the earth.

In writing to his wife, Bismarck speaks in tones of reverent love and tender delicacy and often he rises to the height of a truly poetic inspiration. For her he draws the most vivid pictures of the natural scenery through which he travels, to her he sends the most brilliant descriptions of the persons he has to deal with. When ever he comes to a place, which they have visited together on their wedding trip, he spends his leisure time wandering over the ground again, thinking of her; in fact, next to Goethe's letters to Frau von Stein and in a more distinctly German way Bismarck's letters to his wife are the finest love letters published. They do not speak of love so much as they are permeated with it, dictated by it.

I have dwelt on this phase of my subject at some length, partly because it is, so far, least known, and partly because we

thus secure at the offset a nearer, more intimate view of the man than all his public acts can well afford us.

And yet the time at our disposal is short, and it would be absurd not to consider mainly his world mission and himself in the light of the momentous events which he was chiefly instrumental in bringing about.

To be sure in our attempt to speak correctly of Bismarck the Statesman, we are facing a difficult condition. As yet, many documents will have to be unearthed and studied by trained historians, before even a complete record of the facts is gained.

And, moreover, as yet no centuries have passed by to show definitely just how far he was right or wrong, how far his views were wise or unwise, his plans possible or visionary. We are still, all of us, in the very midst of those social and religious struggles, which Bismarck courageously took up and tried to settle in his own way.

Men of action who influence so immediately the very lives and existences of their fellowmen are judged by each one from his own point of view most tenaciously and passionately. No wonder then, that Bismarck, with his vast influence on the fates of many millions of men, should have been and still be the best hated and at the same time the best loved man in Europe, probably in the whole world.

In presenting then my own views I cannot claim for them the final value of scientifically established truth, but I am speaking from my own standpoint, as one who would like to see the cause of humanity advanced everywhere by the widest possible spreading of religious, social, political freedom, who naturally views with sincere sympathy the development of affairs in the land of his former home, but who, above all, likes to see things in their own true light.

Let us then first briefly review the facts. I may say here, in gratitude to my authority and also to reassure my audience, that I have, of course, taken care to verify my personal reminiscences again by reference to some of the most reliable sources; chief among which I quote the books by Bismarck's main historian,

Mr. Lowe. They are in our library and I shall feel best rewarded for my own modest effort, if it could induce many of you to seek further information from that source and other authorities.

Otto von Bismarck was born on April 1, 1815, at Schönhausen, in the old Prussian province of Brandenburg. At the age of six he was sent to Berlin to be educated, first in a preparatory school, then at a Gymnasium. In 1832, in his seventeenth year, he went to the university, first at Göttingen, then after three semesters, to Berlin. He studied law and political economy. After passing the State examination for the civil service he worked for a short time as an assistant clerk, or referendar, at one of the courts of Berlin, later at Aachen and at Potsdam. Here he entered upon his year's service in the army. The year was finished in Greifswald, where Bismarck also heard lectures on agricultural and similar subjects. A number of stories are told concerning the young man's ways and doings. They are rather typical for young men of his kind. We pass them by; but we would insist on the one fact, which is of the greatest importance: Bismarck came from a family of old Prussian noblemen that had been bred and brought up for centuries in the invigorating, rough atmosphere of Northern Germany, on the country soil of their own estate. Like the rest of the petty noblesse of the old Mark, the Bismarcks had given to their king the bravest, fiercest fighters and as Lowe says, mighty hunters and drinkers. A rough and stormy set they are, these Brandenburg country squires. And in Bismarck's veins there pulsed the healthy blood of many of the sturdiest of them all. Of independent, though not extravagant wealth, the Bismarcks quite naturally looked to the Royal court at Berlin as their center of gravitation.

Together, then, with a powerful body, a strong imperious will, a next to brutal self-assertiveness Bismarck also inherited from his fathers their simple thrift, a naive religiousness, his steadfast sense of duty, and as a matter of course, as natural as the daily bread, an unshakable loyalty to his sovereign. But fortu-

nately for himself and for his country, besides these features, which are more or less typical for every Prussian country nobleman, Bismarck inherited from his mother, who was a commoner,—the only commoner that ever married into the Bismarck family—he inherited from her his strong intellect, and the possibility, if not the invariable practice of that high human activity, which the Germans call *Abstraktionsfähigkeit*, the ability to see things as other people see them; qualities which lift Bismarck high above the level of the average Prussian country squire. Lowe says that Bismarck could not have been more careful in the choice of his parents. To me it seems that a few more women like his mother might have married into the family to good advantage for Otto.

Returning now to our young hero we left him at Greifswald listening to lectures on agriculture. Brought up in the traditions of the family he first intended to be what his forefathers had been, a farming nobleman.

With few short interruptions he really spent the next years on the estate, which he in the meantime inherited. In 1847 he married, and soon after he went as deputy knight to the Prussian Diet then convoked at Berlin, afterwards as Prussian representative to the German parliaments at Francfort and at Erfurt; everywhere the staunchest champion of the old régime, of the unrestricted sovereignty of his king, fiercely opposed to popular self-government, and, with his proud feeling of Prussian superiority, scoffing at the idea of his king allying himself on equal terms with the whole of South German princes and under the tutelage of Austria. Not that he failed to cherish the idea of national unity; but his idea of this unity was very different from the dreams of the Francfort revolutionary patriots. As the main parliamentary spokesman for the rights of the crown and for the policy of the Prussian government, when the latter had been forced to humiliating conditions at the conference of Olmütz, Bismarck soon won the confidence of the king and in 1851 he was made Secretary to the envoy of Prussia at the Diet of Francfort and soon, at the recommendation of the envoy him-

self, became the successor of the same. In this capacity he remained till 1859, and more and more his counsel came to be considered as the guiding element in Prussian politics. In his foreign policy his main desire was to prevent Austria from lord-ing it over to Prussia. For this reason he was careful to avoid all other foreign complications, and he openly declared the necessity for Prussia of driving Austria out of the Confederacy by force. His aggressive attitude gradually became embarrassing for the government, and when in 1859, William I became the regent in place of his weakminded brother, Bismarck was transferred to Petersburg as Minister to Russia.

His time had not yet come, and meanwhile he was placed on ice to be used in an emergency, "kaltgestellt" as he expressed it himself.

His time soon came. The king got into trouble with his parliament, and Bismarck was called to Berlin to straighten matters out. This he did, by interpreting the constitution in his own way and acting accordingly. A conflict between the two governing factors, the king and the parliament, had not been provided for in the constitution, so he argued. Thereupon the king could do as he pleased; and Bismarck as the king's servant ruled Prussia, increased the army, ran the whole State machine without a budget for all these things having been allowed by parliament. Against the outspoken will of the House he declared and conducted the Danish war in 1864, and he also entered upon the final struggle with Austria in 1866. Here at last the unparalleled success of the Prussian arms, the complete victory over the old rival, the dawn of the new possibility of a united Germany under Prussian leadership carried away all further opposition. The House gave full indemnity to the government and its minister, voted 50 million thaler for the further support of his policy and gave to Bismarck himself a royal present of 400,000 thaler to express the nation's gratitude. From now on Bismarck manages the affairs of Prussia with undisputed authority as the premier and only responsible minister: responsible only to the king who is virtually under his

tutelage, though at times a bit unmanageable. We can of course not review here the inner and outer history of Prussia and Germany and Europe; and it is not necessary, either: the events are too well known in general.

The question was to develop and properly direct the feeling for German unity in the Southern states, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, which at the instance of the great "protector of oppressed nationalities," Napoléon III, had been guaranteed and made to accept international and separate independence. To be sure, Napoléon repeatedly made known to Bismarck his price for his consent to German unity. He wanted a good slice, Luxemburg and the whole left side of the Rhine for himself, then Prussia might manage the rest. But Bismarck withstood all temptations. He said, if ever he was to give himself up to the devil it must be a teutonic devil, not a Gallic one. So he patiently waited and eventually declined to accept Baden alone into the confederacy, until Napoléon, seeing that Bismarck was determined not to sacrifice any German territory as a bribe for the rest of it, concluded to help himself somehow. He approached Holland and nearly succeeded in getting from it the thoroughly German province of Luxemburg, when Bismarck at the last moment intervened, and at the conference in London, summoned at the instance of Napoléon, succeeded in having Luxemburg recognized as a neutral commonwealth under European guarantee. At last in 1870 the tense situation came to its natural and long expected climax and Bismarck was then ready for it. He had been gradually brought to see that France must have her war, and he was glad to see it come at a time, when the reckoning could be had with Napoléon alone without the interference of other powers. The situation is perfectly clear. Napoléon agitated, as Lowe says, by his robberlike desire for German territory, and, moreover, instigated by his queen, Eugénia, who was acting under Jesuit influence, had his minister Benedetti present to the old king of Prussia some most humiliating demands, almost commands. The king promptly resented the insult and refused to see the ambassador again. He telegraphed to his

chancellor what had happened, authorizing him, if he saw fit to do so, to make the affair known to the public. Bismarck did so, and partly in patriotic indignation over the insult done to his king, partly with the shrewd design to make any peaceful redress impossible in the minds of the French chauvinists, he formulated his despatch to the Press so as to give special prominence to the rebuff, which the French ambassador had received. And this is the only thing that Bismarck ever did towards bringing on the Franco-German war. He just helped Napoleon and his bloodthirsty court-party to convince the French people that war with Germany was necessary.

To be sure, the war was really the organic development out of the whole situation created by Napoléon. No patriotic Prussian could really wish to avoid it at the expense of his country's honor and safety. Moreover, it must be said, that Bismarck in his despatch in no way misrepresented matters, he stated precisely what had occurred, and if he did so in a tone of indignation and defiance, it is difficult to see how he can be blamed for that despatch. The war then broke out, declared by France. France was conquered and freed from her unworthy tyrant. In turn united Germany took 5,000 Millions of Francs as indemnity and the originally German, but then pretty thoroughly frenchified provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Since then, as you know, France has never for a moment given up the idea of revenge, and the gigantic struggle for life and death is sure to come in the near future.

Bismarck's war record ends herewith: the rest of his life he devoted to his foreign policy: to peace-making. He became the "honest broker," as he said, to whose skill and efforts the preservation of peace between the main civilized powers of Europe since 1871 is chiefly due. At times, to be sure, the political horizon looked threatening enough. Russia felt bitterly disappointed, for a while, in consequence of the Berlin conference, after the Turco-Russian war, when Bismarck at the height of his power, virtually deciding the fate and largely directing the policy of the

European nations, did not satisfy all of Russia's ambition in the Eastern problem.

Spain resented the attempt of Germany to take hold of the Caroline Islands, till Germany, practically withdrawing her claims, submitted the matter to the decision of the Pope. England, especially was for a time obnoxiously obdurate in her opposition to German colonial expansion. As Lowe again rightly says, in the whole game of politics after the Franco-Prussian war the Germans had gotten all the honors, but the English had secured the tricks, and when Germany at last awoke to the necessity of occupying what she could of the uncivilized land not yet taken by England, the cousins on the Islands, while wanting badly enough Bismarck's advice and support in the Egyptian question, were yet inclined to obstruct as much as possible his own modest colonial plans. However, the chancellor succeeded to the end of his career, in avoiding further bloody conflicts. All other nations, except perhaps France, gradually came to recognize his sincere desire for peace; and they saw in him and his policy the strongest guarantee against international complications. Many and stormy, on the other hand, were the struggles that awaited him in his conduct of the domestic affairs of the fatherland.

In consequence of, and even during the Franco-German war, on January 18th of 1871, the long cherished dreams of the German patriots had at last come to be fulfilled. Germany was united. The Imperial crown was offered to the King of Prussia, both by the German Parliament and by the princes of the various states. The realization of the nation's dreams was mainly Bismarck's work, though it is true that, the crown prince Frederick William, afterwards Emperor Frederick III, for some time had been inclined to rush matters, even against the free will of the South, a policy of coercion which Bismarck had sternly refused to support.

As in other matters, which were not to his liking, so also in this question of national unity, which had been solved by himself, Bismarck promptly adapted himself to the new order of

things. Fundamentally opposed to constitutional restrictions of the crown so far as Prussia was concerned, he yet never—so far as I can see—really violated the constitution, though I am not sure of this. In any case he made use of it, rather than further oppose it, when it once had become an accomplished fact. So also with the freedom of the press; and so especially with the relation of Prussia towards the whole of Germany. Born a Prussian, every inch of him, and strictly limiting his patriotism to his “narrower fatherland” as long as it stood alone among the rest of German states, dealing *a priori* with every non-Prussian as with a foreigner, he promptly extended the horizon of his patriotic devotion and care, when the other German states had become associated with Prussia under conditions which guaranteed due predominance to the latter, to his own native Prussia and his sovereign. He severely rebuked the Prussian Conservatives when they wanted him to deal more harshly with the conquered king of Hanover, with Saxony and later with the Southern States.

Altogether the Conservatives, really the reactionary party of Prussian country nobility, gave him a great deal of trouble, by their intrigues in conspiracy with the military court party under the leadership of Emperor William’s own wife, queen Augusta. Owing, however, to the emperor’s unlimited confidence in the man who had done so much for him and his dynasty, Bismarck succeeded, not without difficulty, in keeping the evil influence of the intriguers within comparatively innocuous limits, and one of his worst enemies, Count Arnim, had to feel the whole weight of the Chancellor’s wrath.

Count Arnim, immediately after the war, minister to France, was probably a more ingenious man than Bismarck, but he lacked the true earnest patriotism, the sterling character of Bismarck. He was a selfish trifler with honor and duty. After his attempt to frustrate Bismarck’s plan had been thwarted and he had been dismissed from office, he still tried to undermine the nation’s confidence in her Chancellor by publishing a series of “revelations,” calculated to exhibit his own good judgment and

the blunders of his successful rival. Bismarck fought him to the bitter end. He published other documents showing the falseness of Arnim's assertions and then had the faithless employee prosecuted and banished out of the land, a just, but very energetic procedure against a man who had been holding some of the highest offices in the empire, who was the favorite of the court party and who belonged to one of the most influential old families of the Prussian nobility.

The country squires were more careful after that in their dealings with Bismarck. But other struggles worried and kept worrying the Chancellor.

In 1870 just before France or rather Napoléon had declared war against Protestant Prussia the Pope in Rome, Pio Nono, had summoned the Catholic bishops to Rome, to a concilium, which was to proclaim His, the Pope's infallibility. The new dogma was first strenuously opposed by the German bishops, but on their return from Rome they submitted and proceeded to excommunicate those German professors and priests, who adhered to their old faith and declined to adopt the innovation.

These professors and priests, of course, received their salaries from the German people and government. They were German officials, and the government promptly recognized its duty to protect its own citizens and employees. It would not allow a foreign power to ostracize and thereby socially and financially ruin its officials as long as they remained faithful to the regulations under which they had been appointed. This situation gave rise to the famous "Kulturkampf," the fight for civilization as the governmental forces called it, the religious oppression as the papal party said. The government claimed the right to be heard and consulted in the appointment of catholic ministers. As the latter drew state salaries and were authorized to perform important civil services, their appointment was to be subject to governmental approval. All ministers then in offices were required to promise faithful obedience to state laws. The catholic clergy protested. Hundreds and hundreds of ministers were then stricken off from the pay rolls; their official civil actions,

such as performance of the marriage ceremony, were declared invalid so far as the state was concerned. The church refused to appoint other men instead, and thus hundreds of communities were without a minister officially. The fiercest enmity developed between the catholics and other citizens. The clergy succeeded in identifying the former with their clerical submission to the Pope. A papal party calling itself the Catholic Party, was formed, and finally Bismarck had largely to submit. A few important governmental measures, to be sure, have never yet been given up, but then the papal party, the "Ultramontanes," also still exists and it is now the strongest party in the "Reichstag." In fact, this incongruity, a strictly catholic sectarian political party at the end of our century, in one of our most enlightened nations, will probably be the longest survivor of the "Kulturkampf." Bismarck was distinctly beaten in this case. And it has been said that he was equally unsuccessful against another enemy, the Socialist party.

Here, however, the matter stands quite differently. True, the Socialist party has gained tremendously during the last thirty years, in spite of all that Bismarck did to suppress its propaganda. In 1871 it entered parliament with but two members; now, in 1898, there are fifty-six Socialists in the Reichstag. This indeed, looks like a defeat of Bismarck; but as a matter of fact, Bismarck has never allowed the socialists the slightest direct influence on the conduct of German affairs. He has bargained and bartered and compromised with all other parties, one after the other, just as he needed them or could do without them in the pursuit of his own policy. The socialists he has never thus recognized personally. He did, however, while sternly suppressing the revolutionary anarchistic propaganda not forget at the same time to introduce remedial measures against the very evils the socialists complained of. He inaugurated what has been rightly called a pronounced state socialism. In a way, then, he did precisely what was wanted by the socialists. But for reasons of their own the latter failed to recognize the fact and continued their fight.

And yet, though still the same in name as the party of thirty years ago, the socialists themselves have in the meantime changed their own character very largely. At their last convention at Stuttgart, a few months ago, they declared that more intellect, more enlightened leadership was what they needed; the idea of revolution was denounced and evolution was made the watch-word.

Whatever the effect of these resolutions may be upon the organization of the party itself—perhaps the more radical wing will break away and form a more anarchistically inclined group again,—the fact is that when the socialistic party at large accepts reform by governmental measures, it practically stands on Bismarck's own platform of state socialism.

In 1890, as you know, Prince Bismarck the Unifier of Germany, the international peacemaker for twenty years, the national hero, the venerable, faithful servant of Emperor William and Emperor Frederick, was summarily dismissed from office by the young Emperor William II. That such a thing was possible under the constitution has set many a German to thinking hard about the rights of the crown. The young emperor could hardly be blamed. Young and strong and ambitious, enjoying keenly the glory and power of his position, with an exalted sense of duty and perhaps a still higher opinion of his own ability, he could not tolerate the restricting will or advice of an old servant of his grandfather and his father. It was the system that was at fault; and I believe that the fall of Bismarck, the rather unmodern exponent of monarchical theories, has done much to promote the cause of the popular liberal government.

Personally he deeply resented his dismissal and never quite made his peace with William II. He continued, from his country seat at Friedrichsruh, to make his warning voice heard, whenever an especially critical situation developed. In his criticism of the young emperor and his staff he at times grew rather petty, showing his personal irritation, and again he would startle the whole world by revelations of diplomatic transactions which in the opinion of many should not have been made public. Alto-

gether it is probably not asserting too much, when we say that the young emperor felt quite relieved, when a few weeks ago the old ex-chancellor's death was announced. The people of Germany, however, had never during the time of his official disgrace ceased to revere and celebrate him as their national hero.

But when in conclusion we try to summarize and briefly express the fundamental tendencies of his life, we must not be deceived by such terms as "national hero" or "unifier of Germany." We must not think that Bismarck was, what the Napoléons professed to be, a believer in the idea of nationality. The central idea in Bismarck's political work was not the phantom of nationality, a complete absurdity in our modern times, but it was the reality of the *state*. True, he used the idea of nationality when it helped promote his own plans. He united all the German states and provinces he could get hold of, always grouping them so about Prussia as to virtually form a new state with Prussia as the controlling element. True also, he took from France two provinces that were of originally German nationality; and he was quite willing to have the Germans jubilantly accept them as their long separated kinsmen. He also rescued from Denmark the German provinces Schleswig-Holstein. But, as a matter of fact, he had to take them and claim them for Prussia in order to prevent Austria from getting control over them. And in taking Alsace-Lorraine he simply saw that they were the gates through which the French could again and again invade Germany. They were indispensable from a military point of view, and that is why he took them. The national idea paramount at the time with the people, had little, if any part, in Bismarck's actions. His ideal was the organized state, the notion of nationality was quite subordinate to it. He did not hesitate to drive out of the German confederacy the thoroughly German provinces of Austria. He coldly left them to their fate to cope with their hordes of Slavs as best they could. He never encouraged any demonstration of German sympathies abroad. The dissatisfied German-Austrians, eager to regain their brother Germans from whom they had been torn away, he harshly rebuked, show-

ing that their duty was loyal adherence to their own state. The German provinces in Russia never found in Bismarck a friend or protector against Russian despotism. The German-Americans Bismarck never expected to be disloyal to their adopted country. He scorned as treacherous the idea of a man living in one state and looking to another for sympathy or protection.

And this idea of the state, the organization as the supreme ruling factor also prevailed in his inner politics. The state he upheld against any clerical power. State socialism, with state control of the railroads, of the sale of tobacco and liquors, of life and accident insurance, etc., was his solution of the social and economic question.

Personally he was inclined to be harsh, regardless not so much of the rights but of the feelings of others. At times, in the treatment of his subordinates and his colleagues in the cabinet he was nothing less than brutal. He probably had little of what we call the finer sensibilities. He was a Spartan rather than an Athenian. The lack of the more subtle, humane element, quite natural as we saw in a man of his extraction, was balanced by the severest sense of duty and by a simple religiousness, which occasionally inspired him to acts and utterances worthy of a Goethe. More prominent than any other quality is the superb strength of the man. By the example of his powerful personality he has put before the Germans a new ideal of manhood, which, if not the highest in itself, is yet likely to prove a wholesome reaction against the dreamy, introspective type which has so far been common in the fatherland.